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WAS KEYNES’S MONETARY POLICY, 
À OUTRANCE IN THE TREATISE, 
A FORERUNNER OF ZIRP AND QE? 
DID HE CHANGE HIS MIND IN THE
GENERAL THEORY?
 
Introduction. Keynes’s Challenge: ZIRP and QE
At the end of 1930, as the 1929 US stock market crash was starting to have an impact on the real
economy in the form of falling commodity prices, falling output, and rising unemployment, John
Maynard Keynes, in the concluding chapters of his Treatise on Money, launched a challenge to
monetary authorities to take “deliberate and vigorous action” to reduce interest rates and reverse
the crisis. He argues that until “extraordinary,” “unorthodox” monetary policy action “has been
taken along such lines as these and has failed, need we, in the light of the argument of this trea-
tise, admit that the banking system can not, on this occasion, control the rate of investment, and,
therefore, the level of prices” (Keynes 1930a, 387).1 The “unorthodox” policies that Keynes recom-
mends are a nearly perfect description of the Japanese central bank’s experiment with a zero inter-
est rate policy (ZIRP) in the 1990s and the Federal Reserve’s experiment with ZIRP, accompanied by
quantitative easing (QE1 and QE2), during the recent crisis. These experiments may be considereda response to Keynes’s challenge, and to provide a clear test of
his belief in the power of monetary policy to counter financial
crisis. That response would appear to be a clear No.
The Objectives of Monetary Policy
In the penultimate chapter of volume 2 of the Treatise, Keynes
raises the question of the ability of the monetary authority to
influence the price level: “I reach at last the crux of the whole
matter. We have endeavoured to analyse and to classify the mul-
tifarious factors which determine the price level and the means
by which the central bank in a closed system, or the aggregate
behaviour of central banks throughout the world, can influence
and dominate the behaviour of the banking and monetary sys-
tem as a whole. But when all is said and done, does it lie within
the power of a central bank in actual practice to pursue a pol-
icy which will have the effect of fixing the value of money at any
prescribed level?” (339).
Keynes confronts this question in the context of setting the
central bank the legal “duty of preserving the purchasing power
of money within narrow limits” (ibid.). While he indicates that
he had formerly been favorably disposed to such a proposition,
he notes that the “reasonable doubts expressed by persons of
great experience” (345) had tested his resolve. He refers in par-
ticular to committee hearings held in the United States on the
issue of whether the Federal Reserve Act should be amended “to
lay upon the Federal Reserve Board the duty of using all the
powers at its disposal to ‘promote a stable price level for com-
modities in general’” (340). In particular, the hearings raised
the question of how international conditions impact commod-
ity prices, and thus domestic prices, and the difficulty of using
monetary policy to counter declining prices in a depression. 
Despite his doubts, Keynes nonetheless answers his own
question  in  the  affirmative,  urging  central  bankers  to  adopt
extraordinary, unorthodox measures in an attempt to counter
the deepening recession. His proposals are virtually identical to
the measures that were taken by the Bank of Japan in counter-
ing the collapse of asset prices in the 1990s and the policies
adopted  by  the  Federal  Reserve  in  response  to  the  financial
crash of 2007–08. 
The Treatise and the Alternative Determination 
of Prices
Keynes’s position is built on the explanation of price determi-
nation that he had attempted to provide as an alternative to the
traditional quantity theory. His approach was based on the for-
mulation of “fundamental equations” for the prices of what he
called “available” and “non-available” output: “We have claimed
to prove in this treatise that the price level of output depends on
the level of money incomes relatively to efficiency, on the vol-
ume of investment (measured in cost of production) relatively
to saving, and on the ‘bearish’ or ‘bullish’ sentiment of capital-
ists relatively to the supply of savings deposits available in the
banking system. We have claimed, further, that the banking sys-
tem can control the supply of savings deposits, and hence the
third factor; that it can by the terms of credit influence to any
required extent the volume of investment, and hence the second
factor; and that the indirect effects of its influence on the vol-
ume of investment determine the money offers which entrepre-
neurs make to the factors of production, and hence the first
factor. But we have not claimed that the banking system can
produce any of these effects instantaneously; or that it can be
expected always to foresee the operation of non-monetary fac-
tors in time to take measures in advance to counteract their
influence on prices; or that it can avoid violent fluctuations in
the prices of different classes of commodities relatively to one
another; or that a central bank, which is a member of an inter-
national system, can preserve domestic stability irrespective of
the behavior of other central banks” (345–46).
In simple terms, Keynes argued that prices would be deter-
mined by unit labor costs (efficiency wages) and the pressure of
demand (caused by a divergence of savings from investment).
The focus of recovery policy should thus be to increase invest-
ment in order to drive up the demand for output, absorbing
excess  production  and  encouraging  entrepreneurs  to  again
expand employment and production. Keynes points out that
his approach is substantially different from that of the quantity
theorists, in that there is no direct impact of money on prices.
Indeed, he notes the opposition that they might raise against his
approach: that it would generate inflation rather than recovery
of output. 
Keynes’s conclusions regarding the limitations of the bank-
ing system’s ability to control the price level include: 
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• It is much easier to preserve stability than to restore it
quickly. 
• Nonmonetary  causes  of  instability  may  sometimes
arise so suddenly that it is impossible to counteract
them in time. 
• Strong  social  or  political  forces  may  cause  sponta-
neous changes in the money rates of efficiency wages,
and thus the control of the price level may pass beyond
the power of the banking system. 
• If the country adheres to an international standard
that is itself unstable, it is, of course, impossible to pre-
serve the stability of the domestic price level. Thus,
even if the banking system is strong enough to pre-
serve the stability of the price level, it does not follow
that it is strong enough both to alter the price level and
to establish equilibrium at the new level without long
delays and frictions.
“In short,” says Keynes, “I should attribute to the banking
system much greater power to preserve investment equilibrium
than to force the prevailing rate of money incomes away from
the existing level or from the level produced by spontaneous
changes, to a new and changed level imposed by conditions
abroad or by arbitrary decree at home” (352). 
Short-Term and Long-Term Rates of Interest
A major difficulty that Keynes recognizes in his reasoning is
that “the main direct influence of the banking system is over the
short-term rate of interest. But when it is a question of control-
ling the rate of investment, not in working capital but in fixed
capital, it is the long-term rate of interest which chiefly matters.
How can we be sure that the long-term rate of interest will
respond to the wishes of the currency authority which will be
exerting its direct influence, as it must, mainly on the short-
term rate?” (ibid.). 
But he does not consider this a real problem, since “experi-
ence shows that, as a rule, the influence of the short-term rate
of interest on the long-term rate is much greater than anyone
who argued on the above lines would have expected. We shall
find, moreover, that there are some sound reasons, based on the
technical character of the market, why it is not unnatural that
this should be so” (353). Keynes cites the work of the American
economist Winfield William Riefler (1930), who drew on statis-
tical studies by the Federal Reserve Board to show that ”’all the
important movements in short-term rates from 1919 to 1928
were reflected in bond yields. Minor fluctuations in short-term
rates were also frequently reflected in bond yields, even in the
years 1921 and 1926’”(quoted in ibid.). Riefler observes that,
“‘the surprising fact is not that bond yields are relatively stable
in comparison with short-term rates, but rather that they have
reflected fluctuations in short-term rates so strikingly and to
such a considerable extent’” (ibid., 355–56).2
Keynes then outlines the reasons why these results shouldn’t
be surprising:
(a) If the running yield on bonds is greater than the
rate payable in short-term loans, a profit is obtainable
by borrowing short in order to carry long-term secu-
rities, so long as the latter do not actually fall in value
during the currency of the loan. . . .
(b) There are a number of financial institutions . . .
which vary from time to time the proportionate divi-
sion of their assets between long-term and short-term
securities  respectively.  Where  short-term  yields  are
high, the safety and liquidity of short-term securities
appear  extremely  attractive.  But  when  short-term
yields are very low, not only does this attraction disap-
pear, but another motive enters in, namely, a fear lest
the institution may be unable to maintain its estab-
lished level of income, any serious falling off in which
would be injurious to its reputation. A point comes,
therefore, when they hasten to move into long-dated
securities; the movement itself sends up the price of
the latter; and this movement seems to confirm the
wisdom of those who were recommending the policy
of the changeover. Thus, unless there is a serious rea-
son in the minds of the majority of those controlling
funds  for  positively  fearing  long-term  securities  at
their existing price level, this price will tend to rise a
little, and the initial small price will tend to become a
bigger one through its increasing the general anxiety
amongst those who cannot afford to see their income
from running yield suffer a serious fall, lest they miss
the bus. (357–58) Policy Note, 2011/4 4
In addition to these “technical reasons,” Keynes raises an
issue  that  would  take  on  greater  importance  in  the  General
Theory: the predominant impact of short-term realizations on
long-term expectations. “In truth,” he writes, “we know almost
nothing about the more remote future. . . . The value of a com-
pany’s shares, and even of its bonds, will be found to be sensi-
tive to a degree, which a rational observer from outside might
consider quite absurd, to short-period fluctuations in its known
or anticipated profits. . . . 
“Nor need we be surprised. The ignorance of even the best-
informed  investor  about  the  more  remote  future  is  much
greater than his knowledge, and he cannot but be influenced to
a degree which would seem wildly disproportionate to anyone
who really knew the future, by the little which he knows for cer-
tain, or almost for certain, about the recent past and the near
future, and be forced to seek a clue mainly here to trends fur-
ther ahead. But if this is true of the best informed, the vast
majority . . . know almost nothing whatever about what they are
doing.  They  do  not  possess  even  the  rudiments  of  what  is
required for a valid judgment, and are the prey of hopes and
fears easily aroused by transient events and as easily dispelled.
This is one of the odd characteristics of the capitalist system
under which we live, which, when we are dealing with the real
world, is not to be overlooked.
“But there is also a further reason why it may often profit
the wisest to anticipate mob psychology rather than the real
trend of events, and to ape reason proleptically. For the value of
a security is determined, not by the terms on which one could
expect to purchase the whole block of the outstanding interest,
but by the small fringe which is the subject of actual dealing;
just as current new investment is only a small fringe on the edge
of the totality of existing investments. Now this fringe is largely
dealt in by professional financiers—speculators you may call
them—who have no intention of holding the securities long
enough for the influence of distant events to have its effect;
their object is to re-sell to the mob after a few weeks or at most
a few months. It is natural, therefore, that they should be influ-
enced by the cost of borrowing, and still more by their expecta-
tions  on  the  basis  of  past  experience  of  the  trend  of  mob
psychology. Thus, so long as the crowd can be relied on to act in
a certain way, even if it be misguided, it will be to the advantage
of the better-informed professional to act in the same way—a
short period ahead” (359–61).
Short-Term Money: Quantity Is as Important 
as Price
Having established the importance of the short term in formu-
lating  long-term  expectations,  and  thus  the  possibility  that
short-term interest rates could be used to influence long-term
capital investment decisions, Keynes goes on to admit, “I do not
believe . . . that the volume of investment either in working cap-
ital or in liquid capital is sensitive to changes in the short-term
rate  of  interest  by  itself  and  unless  these  changes  create  an
expectation of changes in prices. Fluctuations in the volume of
investment in working and liquid capital play a large part, of
course, in the accentuation of booms and depressions; but I
doubt if they can be either caused or avoided merely by changes
of bank rate. They generally represent a belated response to
changes in the price level which have been brought about by an
unbalanced volume of investment in fixed capital. . . .
“Such effects as can be produced directly on the willingness
to invest in working in liquid capital are attributable, I think,
rather to the greater or less degree in which the fringe of ‘unsat-
isfied’ borrowers . . . is satisfied than to the cheapness or dear-
ness of money in itself.
“On  the  other  hand,  the  direct  effects  of  cheap  money
operating through changes, even small ones, in the bond mar-
ket . . . on the volume of new investment is probably of more
importance. Willingness to invest more or less in manufactur-
ing plant is not likely to be very sensitive to small changes in
bond rate” (364).
Extraordinary Measures: ZIRP and QE
But Keynes goes on: “So far we have been dealing with the nor-
mal and orthodox methods by which a central bank can use its
powers for easing (or stiffening) the credit situation to stimu-
late (or retard) the rate of new investment. If these measures are
applied  in  the  right  degree  and  at  the  right  time,  I  doubt
whether it would often be necessary to go beyond them or to
apply the extraordinary methods next to be considered. It is
only, that is to say, if the milder remedies have not been applied
in time, so that conditions of acute slump or boom have been
allowed to develop, that more extreme measures will have to 
be  invoked  and  that  doubts  may  be  reasonably  entertained
whether  even  these  more  extreme  measures  will  be  wholly 
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“These extraordinary methods are, in fact, no more than an
intensification of the normal procedure of open-market operations
[emphasis  added].  I  do  not  know  of  any  case  in  which  the
method of open-market operations has been carried out à out-
rance. Central banks have always been too nervous hitherto—
partly, perhaps under the influence of crude versions of the
quantity  theory—of  taking  measures  which  would  have  the
effect of causing the total volume of bank money to depart
widely from its normal value, whether in excess or in defect. But
this attitude of mind neglects, I think, the part which the ‘bull-
ishness’ or ‘bearishness’ of the public plays in the demand for
bank money; it forgets the financial circulation in its concern
for the industrial circulation, and overlooks the statistical fact
that the former may be quite as large as the latter and much
more capable of sharp variation. . . . On such occasions the cen-
tral bank should carry its open-market operations to the point
of satisfying to saturation the desire of the public to hold sav-
ings deposits, or of exhausting the supply of such deposits in
the contrary case.
“The risk of bringing to bear too rapidly and severely on
the industrial circulation, when it is the financial circulation
which is being aimed at, is greater, I think in the case of a con-
traction of credit than in the case of an expansion. But, on the
other hand, it is less likely to be necessary to resort to extreme
measures to check a boom than to check a slump. . . .
“My remedy in the event of the obstinate persistence of the
slump would consist, therefore, in the purchase of securities by
the central bank until the long-term market rate of interest has
been brought down to the limiting point, which we shall have
to admit a few paragraphs further on. It should not be beyond
the power of a central bank (international complications apart)
to bring down the long-term market-rate of interest to any fig-
ure at which it is itself prepared to buy long-term securities. For
the bearishness of the capitalist public is never very obstinate,
and when the rate of interest on savings deposits is next door to
nothing the saturation point can fairly soon be reached. If the
central bank supplies the member banks with more funds than
they can lend at short term, in the first place the short-term rate
of interest will decline towards zero, and in the second place the
member banks will soon begin, if only to maintain their prof-
its, to second the efforts of the central bank by themselves buy-
ing securities. This means that the price of bonds will rise until
there are many persons to be found who, as they see the prices
of long-term bonds rising, prefer to sell them and hold the pro-
ceeds liquid at a very low rate of interest. If (e.g.) the long-term
rate is 3 per cent per annum above the short-term rate, this
means that the mathematical expectation for bond prices in the
minds of such persons is for a fall of 3 per cent per annum; and
at that and at a time when bond prices are in fact rising and the
central bank is accentuating the cheapness of money, there is
not likely to be a large volume of such selling—unless the price
of bonds has been driven to a level which is generally believed
to be quite excessive from the long-period point of view, a con-
tingency and a limiting factor to the consideration of which we
will return shortly. If the effect of such measures is to raise the
price of ‘equities’ (e.g., ordinary shares) more than the price of
bonds, no harm in a time of slump will result from this; for
investment can be stimulated by its being unusually easy to
raise resources by the sale of ordinary shares as well as by high
bond prices. Moreover, a very excessive price for equities is not
likely to occur at a time of depression and business losses.
“Thus I see small reason to doubt that the central bank can
produce a large effect on the cost of raising new resources for
long-term investment, if it is prepared to persist with its open-
market policy far enough. What, however, are in practice the fac-
tors limiting the degree in which it can push such a policy home?
“There is, first of all, the question of the sufficiency of its
‘ammunition,’ i.e., of its power to go on buying or selling in ade-
quate quantity securities of the suitable kind. The lack of suit-
able ammunition is more likely to hamper a central bank when
it is seeking to contract the volume of bank money than when
it is seeking to expand it, since its stock of securities at the com-
mencement of its contraction policy is necessarily limited. But
it also operates, in a sense, against an expansionist policy, since
a  central  bank  is  generally  limited  in  the  type  of  securities
which  it  purchases,  so  that,  if  it  continues  such  purchases
beyond a certain point, it may create an entirely artificial posi-
tion in them relatively to other securities. It is to provide against
the contingency of insufficient ammunition for the carrying on
of open-market operations à outrance that I have suggested . . .
that the central bank should have power to vary within limits
the reserve requirements of its member banks” (369–72). 
Keynes then notes that if the central bank may be purchas-
ing securities at rates “far beyond what it considers to be the long-
term norm . . . this will mean that these purchases, when in due
course they have to be reversed by sales at a later date, may show
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“We might perhaps expect the central bank, as representing
the public interest, to be ready to run the risks of the future
prospects when private interest reckons these risks to be unusu-
ally high. But the choice may conceivably lie between assuming
the burden of a prospective loss, allowing the slump to con-
tinue, and socialistic action, by which some official body steps
into the shoes which the feet of the entrepreneurs are too cold
to occupy.3
“I would repeat, however, that these extreme situations are
not likely to arise except as a result of some previous mistake
which has prevented the slumping tendency from being reme-
died at an earlier stage before so complete a lack of confidence
had sapped the spirits and the energies of enterprise” (373).
“A partial recovery, therefore, is to be anticipated merely
through the elapse of time and without the application of pur-
poseful remedies. But if my diagnosis is correct, we cannot hope
for a complete or lasting recovery until there has been a very
great fall in the long-term market rate of interest throughout
the world towards something nearer pre-war levels. Failing this,
there will be a steady pressure towards profit deflation and a
sagging  price  level”  (384).  Thus,  Keynes  concludes,  without
extraordinary policies, “the thing will never cure itself by the
lack of borrowers forcing down the rate; for it absorbs just as
much savings to finance losses as to finance investment” (ibid.).
“The remedy should come, I suggest, from a general recogni-
tion that the rate of investment need not be beyond our control,
if we are prepared to use our banking systems to effect a proper
adjustment of the market rate of interest. It might be sufficient
merely to produce a general belief in the long continuance of a
very low rate of short-term interest. The change, once it has
begun, will feed on itself” (386).
It would appear that the Bank of Japan, by introducing a
zero interest rate policy, experimented with Keynes’s recom-
mendation that interest rates be set as low as possible, and that
the Federal Reserve, through its program of quantitative lend-
ing, has followed his recommendation in full by purchasing
long-term securities to bring down the long-term rate of inter-
est and satiate the desire to hold deposits. Keynes notes that
these policies are not at all different from normal open-market
policies, and that the central bank possesses the power to set any
interest rate, short or long, at any level it desires. It also appears
as if Keynes’s expectation that the public would become willing
buyers  of  government  securities  upon  a  sharp  reduction  in
short rates, thereby aiding the policy of lowering the long-term
rate, was accurate. In addition, we have experienced the recov-
ery of stock prices that Keynes expected.
What has not been borne out is the expected impact on the
rate of investment. Businesses have indeed increased their bor-
rowing, and the spread between corporate junk bonds has fallen
to near-historic lows as companies seek to borrow at historically
low interest rates. However, these funds are not being used to
finance  new  investment.  Similarly,  banks  have  accumulated
record levels of reserves in their deposit accounts at the Fed,
earning the short-term interest rate, which is nearly zero. Thus,
the policy has been successful in influencing the interest rate in
the way Keynes predicted, but it has not had the impact on
investment that he outlined in the Treatise.
A Shift of Position in the General Theory?
Keynes maintained his belief in the efficacy of monetary policy
at least until September 1932, when he writes in the Economic
Journal, “A reduction of the long-term rate of interest to a low
level is probably the most necessary of all measures if we are to
escape from the slump and secure a lasting revival of enter-
prise” (Keynes 1932, 415). However, his position changed with
his development of the General Theory.
Keynes tells his readers that one of the basic differences
between it and the earlier book is the separation of the analysis
of investment in financial assets and capital assets through the
separation of their determinants via liquidity preference and
the marginal efficiency of capital. While the Treatise made a dis-
tinction between industrial and financial circulation, the prices
of both assets and liabilities were treated in a single fundamen-
tal price equation and financed by the financial circulation. 
In his new analysis in the General Theory, Keynes states that
“current investment will depend . . . on what we shall call the
inducement  to  invest;  and  the  inducement  to  invest  will  be
found to depend on the relation between the schedule of the
marginal efficiency of capital and the complex of rates of inter-
est on loans of various maturities and risks” (Keynes 1936, 27).
“The schedule of the marginal efficiency of capital may be said to
govern the terms on which loanable funds are demanded for the
purpose of new investment; whilst the rate of interest governs the
terms on which funds are being currently supplied” (165).
Another novel feature of the General Theory is its emphasis
on the conditions of a monetary economy as “one in which
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quantity of employment and not merely its direction” (ibid.,
vii). In particular, Keynes notes that the major determinant of
the rate of interest will be “largely governed by the prevailing
view as to what its value is expected to be” (203), while “the
schedule of the marginal efficiency of capital is of fundamental
importance  because  it  is  mainly  through  this  factor  (much
more than through the rate of interest) that the expectation of
the future influences the present”(145).
Echoing his views in the Treatise, he writes: “It would be
foolish, in forming our expectations, to attach great weight to
matters which are very uncertain. It is reasonable, therefore, to
be guided to a considerable degree by the facts about which we
feel somewhat confident, even though they may be less deci-
sively relevant to the issue than other facts about which our
knowledge is vague and scanty. For this reason the facts of the
existing situation enter, in a sense disproportionately, into the
formation of our long-term expectations; our usual practice
being to take the existing situation and to project it into the
future, modified only to the extent that we have more or less
definite reasons for expecting a change.
“The state of long-term expectation, upon which our deci-
sions are based, does not solely depend, therefore, on the most
probable forecast we can make. It also depends on the confidence
with which we make this forecast—on how highly we rate the
likelihood of our best forecast turning out quite wrong. If we
expect large changes but are very uncertain as to what precise
form these changes will take, then our confidence will be weak.
“The state of confidence . . . is a matter to which practical
men always pay the closest and most anxious attention” because
of “its important influence on the schedule of the marginal effi-
ciency of capital. There are not two separate factors affecting
the rate of investment, namely, the schedule of the marginal
efficiency of capital and the state of confidence. The state of
confidence is relevant because it is one of the major factors
determining the former” (148–49). Thus, “there is no clear evi-
dence  from  experience  that  the  investment  policy  which  is
socially advantageous coincides with that which is most prof-
itable. It needs more intelligence to defeat the forces of time and
our ignorance of the future than to beat the gun. Moreover, life
is not long enough;—human nature desires quick results, there
is a peculiar zest in making money quickly, and remoter gains
are discounted by the average man at a very high rate. The game
of professional investment is intolerably boring and overexact-
ing  to  anyone  who  is  entirely  exempt  from  the  gambling
instinct; whilst he who has it must pay to this propensity the
appropriate  toll.  Furthermore,  an  investor  who  proposes  to
ignore near-term market fluctuations needs greater resources
for safety and must not operate on so large a scale, if at all, with
borrowed money—a further reason for the higher return from
the  pastime  to  a  given  stock  of  intelligence  and  resources.
Finally it is the long-term investor, he who most promotes the
public interest, who will in practice come in for most criticism,
wherever  investment  funds  are  managed  by  committees  or
boards or banks. For it is in the essence of his behaviour that he
should be eccentric, unconventional and rash in the eyes of
average opinion. If he is successful, that will only confirm the
general  belief  in  his  rashness;  and  if  in  the  short  run  he  is
unsuccessful,  which  is  very  likely,  he  will  not  receive  much
mercy. Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation to
fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally” (157).
As a result, Keynes modifies his prior belief in the positive
impact of lower interest rates on the rate of investment. For
example, “an expectation of a future fall in the rate of interest
will have the effect of lowering the schedule of the marginal effi-
ciency of capital; since it means that the output from equip-
ment produced to-day will have to compete during part of its
life with the output from equipment which is content with a
lower return. This expectation will have no great depressing
effect, since the expectations, which are held concerning the
complex of rates of interest for various terms which will rule in
the future, will be partially reflected in the complex of rates of
interest  which  rule  to-day.  Nevertheless  there  may  be  some
depressing effect, since the output from equipment produced
to-day, which will emerge towards the end of the life of this
equipment,  may  have  to  compete  with  the  output  of  much
younger equipment which is content with a lower return because
of the lower rate of interest which rules for periods subsequent to
the end of the life of equipment produced to-day” (143).
Keynes also modifies his position on the ability of the cen-
tral bank to influence the lending practices of financial institu-
tions through a reduction in interest rates: “So far we have had
chiefly in mind the state of confidence of the speculator or
speculative investor himself and may have seemed to be tacitly
assuming that, if he himself is satisfied with the prospects, he has
unlimited command over money at the market rate of interest.
This is, of course, not the case. Thus we must also take account
of the other facet of the state of confidence, namely, the confi-
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borrow from them, sometimes described as the state of credit.
A collapse in the price of equities, which has had disastrous
reactions on the marginal efficiency of capital, may have been
due to the weakening either of speculative confidence or of the
state of credit. But whereas the weakening of either is enough to
cause a collapse, recovery requires the revival of both. For whilst
the weakening of credit is sufficient to bring about a collapse, its
strengthening, though a necessary condition of recovery, is not
a sufficient condition” (158).
Further,  Keynes  argues  that  there  may  be  difficulty  in 
pushing interest rates down to extremely low levels: “We have
seen . . . that uncertaintyas to the future course of the rate of inter-
est is the sole intelligible explanation of the type of liquidity-
preference . . . which leads to the holding of cash. . . . It follows
that . . . what matters is not the absolute level of r [rate of inter-
est] but the degree of its divergence from what is considered a
fairly safe level of r, having regard to those calculations of prob-
ability which are being relied on. . . . Every fall in r reduces the
market rate relatively to the ‘safe’ rate and therefore increases
the risk of illiquidity; and, in the second place, every fall in r
reduces the current earnings from illiquidity, which are avail-
able as a sort of insurance premium to offset the risk of loss on
capital account, by an amount equal to the difference between
the squares of the old rate of interest and the new. For example,
if the rate of interest on a long-term debt is 4 per cent, it is
preferable to sacrifice liquidity unless on a balance of probabil-
ities it is feared that the long-term rate of interest may rise faster
than by 4 per cent of itself per annum, i.e. by an amount greater
than 0.16 per cent per annum. If, however, the rate of interest is
already as low as 2 per cent, the running yield will only offset a
rise in it of as little as 0.04 per cent per annum. This, indeed, is
perhaps the chief obstacle to a fall in the rate of interest to a very
low level [emphasis added]. Unless reasons are believed to exist
why future experience will be very different from past experi-
ence, a long-term rate of interest of (say) 2 per cent leaves more
to fear than to hope, and offers, at the same time, a running
yield which is only sufficient to offset a very small measure of
fear” (201–02).
Keynes  also  notes  that  the  classical  theory  proposed  an
alternative method of lowering the rate of interest, by “reducing
wages, whilst leaving the quantity of money unchanged. . . . Just
as a moderate increase in the quantity of money may exert an
inadequate influence over the long-term rate of interest, whilst
an immoderate increase may offset its other advantages by its
disturbing effect on confidence; so a moderate reduction in
money-wages  may  prove  inadequate,  whilst  an  immoderate
reduction might shatter confidence even if it were practicable.
“There is, therefore, no ground for the belief that a flexible
wage policy is capable of maintaining a state of continuous full
employment;—any more than for the belief that an open-market
monetary policy is capable, unaided, of achieving this result.
The  economic  system  cannot  be  made  self-adjusting  along
these lines” (267).
Although Keynes continues to maintain that the “short-
term  rate  of  interest  is  easily  controlled  by  the  monetary
authority, both because it is not difficult to produce a convic-
tion  that  its  policy  will  not  greatly  change  in  the  very  near
future, and also because the possible loss is small compared
with  the  running  yield  (unless  it  is  approaching  vanishing
point),” he also observes that “the long-term rate may be more
recalcitrant when once it has fallen to a level which, on the basis
of past experience and present expectations of future monetary
policy,  is  considered  ‘unsafe’  by  representative  opinion.  For
example, in a country linked to an international gold standard,
a rate of interest lower than prevails elsewhere will be viewed
with a justifiable lack of confidence; yet a domestic rate of inter-
est dragged up to a parity with the highest rate (highest after
allowing for risk) prevailing in any country belonging to the
international system may be much higher than is consistent
with domestic full employment” (203).
Thus, the influence of capital’s marginal efficiency on the
rate of investment (independent of the rate of interest) and 
liquidity preference as the (independent) determinant of the
rate of interest leads Keynes to modify his Treatise analysis of
the impact of “extraordinary” monetary policy on the long-
term rate of interest: “A monetary policy which strikes public
opinion as being experimental in character or easily liable to
change may fail in its objective of greatly reducing the long-
term rate of interest, because M2 [speculative funds] may tend
to increase almost without limit in response to a reduction of r
below a certain figure. The same policy, on the other hand, may
prove easily successful if it appeals to public opinion as being
reasonable and practicable and in the public interest, rooted in
strong conviction, and promoted by an authority unlikely to be
superseded”(ibid.).
In the General Theory, Keynes, “after giving full weight to
the importance of the influence of short-period changes in the
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rate of interest,” further modifies his belief in the efficacy of
monetary policy to influence the rate of investment, noting that
“we are still entitled to return to the latter [i.e., the rate of inter-
est] as exercising, at any rate, in normal circumstances, a great,
though not a decisive, influence on the rate of investment. Only
experience, however, can show how far management of the rate
of interest is capable of continuously stimulating the appropri-
ate volume of investment” (164). He then goes on to state: “For
my own part I am now somewhat sceptical of the success of a
merely monetary policy directed towards influencing the rate of
interest. I expect to see the State, which is in a position to calcu-
late the marginal efficiency of capital-goods on long views and
on  the  basis  of  the  general  social  advantage,  taking  an  ever
greater responsibility for directly organising investment; since it
seems likely that the fluctuations in the market estimation of
the marginal efficiency of different types of capital, calculated
on the principles I have described above, will be too great to be
offset by any practicable changes in the rate of interest” (ibid.).
While  Keynes  can  be  considered  the  true  father  of  the
unorthodox monetary policies introduced by the Bank of Japan
and the Federal Reserve, these policies also meet the test of their
efficacy  that  Keynes  called  for.  They  suggest  that  Keynes’s
Treatise optimism was misplaced, and that his more nuanced
position in the General Theory was more appropriate; in partic-
ular, his emphasis on the need to provide an external source of
demand through government expenditure. Finally, in compari-
son with the current period, Keynes did not take into account
the impact of capital loss on the inducement to invest and the
propensity to consume, factors that in all likelihood would have
led him to place even greater emphasis on the role of govern-
ment spending in bringing about recovery.
Notes
1.  Keynes had expressed this view as early as May 1930, in an
article in the Nation that reflects the conclusions of the
Treatise: “The fact is—a fact not yet recognized by the great
public—that we are now in the depths of a very severe
international slump, a slump which will take its place in
history amongst the most acute ever experienced. It will
require not merely passive movements of bank rates to lift
us out of a depression of this order, but a very active and
determined policy” (Keynes 1930b, n.p.).
2.  Keynes does not, however, report Riefler’s caveat that this is
more the result of the impact on the stock of existing long-
terms bonds than on the prices of newly issued long-term
securities; see Riefler 1930, 123.
3.  In Keynes 1932, he notes that “in the United States the fear
of the Member Banks lest they should be unable to cover
their  expenses”  may  have  provided  “an  obstacle  to  the
adoption  of  a  wholehearted  cheap  money  policy”
(421–22). 
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